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Introduction 
International standards have gained increasing prominence in the organisation of production 
and, more generally, markets and society. A recent example is the concern expressed by 
major trade unions about the International Standard ISO 45’001 on occupational health and 
safety, considered not at par with the existing Standards and Guidelines of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) 1. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is only 
one arena among others that have acquired more recognition in setting a growing variety of 
technical specifications. Such new forms of governance in contemporary global political 
economy have elicited questions regarding who has access to such arenas, how decisions are 
made, and more broadly, how civil society organisations (CSOs) can provide input beyond 
ideas in such circumstances2. It indeed remains unclear how CSOs can truly participate in 
standard-setting processes, voice their concerns and be heard when they do so. 
This is a core issue of what we call here technical diplomacy, the negotiating processes 
involving states and non-state actors to set specifications claimed to be based on scientific 
knowledge. A particular case in point is international standards set by bodies such as the ISO. 
International standards do not just bear upon narrow technical specifications for organising 
production, protecting consumers and facilitating international trade in domains such as 
measurements, performance and related effects of manufactured goods and services. Today 
their scope embraces non-physical fields including labour, environment, education, risk and 
security, plus all sorts of management systems and business models. Scholarship on new 
forms of regulation and global governance has emphasized that standards are a central 
component in the organisation of contemporary capitalism and examined how standard-
setting processes privilege powerful actors with considerable financial resources and 
expertise, to the detriment of CSOs3. Such studies have provided major insights on how 
                                                
1 ETUC, ETUC Resolution on ISO DIS 45001 Occupational health and safety management systems 
(Brussels: European Trade Union Confederation, 2016); ITUC, ITUC Statement following approval of 
the ISO Standard 45001 on Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems (Brussels: 
International Trade Union Confederation, 2017); ILO, Guidelines on occupational safety and health 
management systems, ILO-OSH 2001 (Geneva: International Labor Office, 2001), section 3.10.1.1.d. 
2  Manuela Moschella and Catherine Weaver, eds, Handbook of Global Economic Governance 
(London: Routledge, 2013). 
3  Craig Murphy and JoAnne Yates, The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
(London: Routledge, 2009); Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, eds., The Politics of Global Regulation 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Stefano Ponte, Peter Gibbon and Jakob Vestergaard, 
eds., Governing through Standards (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Lawrence Busch, 
Standards. Recipes for Reality (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2011); Leonhard Dobusch and Sigrid 
Quack, “Framing standards, mobilizing users: Copyright versus fair use in transnational regulation“, 
Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2013), pp. 52-88; JoAnne Yates and Craig 
Murphy, Engineering Rules: Global Standard Setting since 1880 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2019 forthcoming); Jean-Christophe Graz, The Power of Standards: Hybrid 
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standards exercise authority and in many respects reflect a democratic deficit; yet they often 
show a shallow understanding of the lack of inclusiveness in distinct socio-technical 
processes. For their part, science and technology studies (STS) have extensively untangled the 
authority of scientific and expert knowledge4. While emphasizing the heterogeneity and 
overlapping of lay- and expert-knowledge, they conceive the participation of CSOs in socio-
technical processes as depending on explicit socio-technical controversies in local or national 
contexts. The possibility of mobilising CSOs seems much more complicated in the absence of 
such controversies, as in the daily work of technical committees of the ISO. 
This article builds on this scholarship to develop a framework of analysis of CSOs’ 
involvement in technical diplomacy and presents results from a project designed to support 
the involvement of CSOs in standards-setting procedures related to the ISO. We place 
particular emphasis on the co-production of socio-technical knowledge embodied in the 
distinct environment of standardisation. Callon and others have developed a sociology of 
translation providing insights on how lay- and expert knowledge comes across in distinct 
encounter points5. In this perspective, three moments are of particular significance: the 
framing of problems, the constitution of research collectives, and the final transposition of 
knowledge from the research collective to its broader recognition by society at large. Our 
analytical framework elaborates such moments of extended translation with a distinct focus 
on CSOs’ participation in standard-setting bodies. The paper argues that CSOs’ participation 
depends on multiple translation practices between lay- and expert-knowledge which affect the 
involvement of actors concerned, the pluralisation of knowledge brought into play, and a 
prospect of at least some influence on the outcome of the process. Empirical findings are 
based on a participatory action-research project led by the authors and funded by the 
University of Lausanne (INTERNORM) to pool academic and CSO participation in official 
ISO technical committees. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology and 
introduces the INTERNORM project. Section 3 provides background on the rising 
prominence of international standards and the democratic deficit affecting standard-setting 
processes. Section 4 reviews the literature on new forms of power and regulation in global 
governance, participatory dynamics in expert arena, and science and technology studies of 
socio-technical processes. Section 5 builds on this scholarship to elaborate our analytical 
framework. Section 6, 7 and 8 provides empirical findings of the INTERNORM project by 
distinguishing the three translation practices between lay- and expert-knowledge affecting 
CSO participation in technical diplomacy. The conclusion wraps up the argument and draws 
larger implications, in particular of how its findings are likely to address the democratic 
deficit of technical diplomacy and current research in the field of international relations.  
                                                                                                                                                   
authority and the globalisation of services  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019 
forthcoming). 
4 Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe, Agir dans un monde incertain (Paris: Seuil, 
2001); Sheila Jasanoff, ed., States of knowledge: the co-production of science and social order (New 
York: Routledge, 2004); Madeleine Akrich, Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, Sociologie de la 
traduction: textes fondateurs (Paris: Presses des Mines, 2006). 
5 Akrich, Callon and Latour, Sociologie de la traduction, op. cit. ; Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, op. 
cit.; Michel Callon, “Four Models for the Dynamics of Sciences“, in Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. 
Markle, James C. Petersen and Trevor Pinch (eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies 
(London: Sage, 1995), pp. 29-63; Michel Callon, “Des différentes formes de démocratie technique“, 
Les cahiers de la sécurité intérieure, Vol. 38 (1999), pp. 35-52. 
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Methods 
The INTERNORM project was conducted between 2010 and 2014 in Switzerland and funded 
by the University of Lausanne (UNIL) in the framework of a program called “Vivre ensemble 
dans l’incertain” (Living together in uncertainty). The overall framework of the program was 
to bridge academia and society at large in order to reinforce the understanding the ability to 
face structural transformations of the contemporary world. It explicitly required an action 
research methodology ensuring a participatory approach. In accordance with the participatory 
action research methodology, all selected projects adopted a dialogical approach that included 
in flexible ways a real participation from civil society likely to rebalance power relations6. 
While the concept of civil society is highly contested and far from tantamount to a 
homogenous social group, within the framework of the INTERNORM project, civil society 
was conceived more narrowly than in most studies in political science emphasizing the close 
relationship between the civil and political spheres. Civil society organisations were thus 
confined to not-for profit organised interests structured as formal associations, with no direct 
commercial stakes; political parties were also excluded.  
The INTERNORM project was conceived as an interactive knowledge pool of academic skills 
and experience gathered by civil society organisations (CSOs), in particular consumer 
associations, environmental protection associations, and trade unions, with the aim of 
supporting the involvement of CSOs in standards-setting procedures. The action research 
design allowed INTERNORM to engage with the literature assuming that a lack of resources 
explains to a large extent the weakness of CSOs participation in such new forms of global 
governance arenas. It provided for additional key resources, such as knowledge, time and 
money, in order to explore their influence on complex participatory dynamics.  
Responsibility for conducting the project was entrusted to a research team from UNIL whose 
main tasks were to initiate and develop discussion, in particular with the project partners, to 
facilitate access to standardisation documents and procedures, and to seek the required 
expertise to support the partner associations in their discussions on the standardisation work 
underway at ISO in the areas they themselves selected among a choice of potentially relevant 
technical committees. In a preliminary stage, a broad call for participation was made to CSOs 
active in various areas, inviting them to join the project and take part to international 
standardisation processes. According to the above-mentioned pragmatic understanding of 
civil society, the selection criteria used to define the CSOs likely to take part to the project 
were the following: 1) not-for-profit organisation with an associative structure; 2) 
membership with no commercial interests; 3) headquarters located in Switzerland. The 
research team also negotiated the membership of INTERNORM to the Swiss Standardisation 
Association (SNV), the Swiss ISO member body providing access to ISO technical 
committees. Finally, it conducted an analysis of standardisation areas and TCs of potential 
interest for associative partners and identified four themes with relevance to civil society: 
nanotechnology, tourism services, non-formal education and quality insurance. The selection 
was mainly based on a requirement for (early) development stage of draft standards enabling 
an effective participation. Following early consultation and deliberation with CSOs that 
joined the project, INTERNORM took part to two ISO technical committees: ISO TC 228 on 
tourism services and ISO TC 229 on nanotechnologies. Considering the high number of 
standards in development in those technical committees, INTERNORM established working 
groups to engage with only those standards under development with the highest stakes for 
CSOs involved in the project.  
                                                
6 Mandakini Pant, “Participatory Action Research”, in David Coghlan and Mary Brydon-Miller (eds), 
The SAGE Encyclopedia of Action Research (London: Sage, 2014), pp. 583-588. 
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As such the research team acted somehow like a “scientist in the lab”7 – the lab being the 
deterritorialised arenas of the technical diplomacy of the ISO and the scientist being the 
research team acting as facilitator between CSOs and standardisation processes. The material 
used for this study is based on official documents, confidential working documents, and in-
depth participatory observations gathered throughout the duration project. At its completion, 
INTERNORM participated in 11 expert groups, spent more than 45 days in ISO technical 
committees and submitted more than 150 comments and drafting recommendations resulting 
from meetings held with partner associations to discuss draft standards under negotiation8.  
International standardisation: rising prominence versus democratic deficit 
International standards refer to voluntary technical specifications explicitly documented, 
published and sold as tools in the organisation of production and exchange of goods and 
services. They codify technical specifications for measurement, design, performances, or side 
effects of products, industrial processes, and services. Many organizations with varying 
private and public statutes set standards across the world. Among them, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC), both private not-for-profit organisations, stand apart with, for ISO alone, over 160 
national members and more than 21’000 published standards. Participation in the standard-
setting activities of the ISO and IEC follows a so-called model of national participation where 
a national body holds the voting rights in the international standardisation bodies. ISO 
members are not states, but each national standard-setting organisation considered as the most 
representative in the country. Standardisation processes involve a mix of private and public 
actors to shape standards on a voluntary basis. On paper, they are open to all interested 
parties, follow the “state of the art” of technical knowledge and a consensus-based decision-
making 9.  
Two decades ago, estimates of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation ant Development 
(OECD) showed that up to 80% of trade is affected by standards or associated technical 
regulations10. In addition to market access, international standards matter for consumers and 
workers in so far as they provide interoperable technological devices, minimum health and 
safety protection measures or quality guarantees with regard to goods and services. The 
significance of international standards pertains not only to their growing share in the economy 
and their impact upon the environment, or the health and safety of workers and consumers. It 
also relates to the institutional environment that establishes formal transfers of power to 
international standard-setting organisations. Technical specifications were once largely the 
preserve of the regulatory framework of law, with company standards decided by managers 
and, to a marginal degree, national standards institutions. Today, as seen above, the regulatory 
framework of law has yielded ground to voluntary standards drafted by a host of public and 
private sector bodies operating internationally or regionally11. 
                                                
7 We thank one of our reviewers for addressing this point. 
8 For more information: see the following website: www.unil.ch/vei/internorm. 
9 This is what Czaya and Hesser call the “ethos of standardisation”: Axel Czaya and Wilfried Hesser, 
“Standardisation Systems as Indicators of Mental, Cultural and Socio-Economic States”, Knowledge, 
Technology, & Policy, Vol. 14, No 3 (2001), pp. 24-40. 
10 OECD, Regulatory Reform and International Standardisation (Paris: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Trade Committee Working Party, 1999), p. 4.  
11 Mattli and Woods, op. cit.; Ponte, Gibbon and Vestergaard, op. cit.; Murphy and Yates, op. cit.; 
Graz, op. cit.; Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
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The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was an important milestone. 
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (AGP), the review of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) all grant international 
standards a major role in the harmonization of technical specifications applicable to goods 
and services. State regulation in this domain must comply with “legitimate objectives” related 
to health, safety and environmental issues. Thus, the goal of removing “unnecessary” barriers 
to trade should be pursued insofar as possible by substituting domestic standards for 
international standards.  
Despite the growing prominence of international standards, they face what Bamberg describes 
as a paradox of “huge minorities”: “the two largest affected groups [consumers and 
employees] are minorities within the standards committees, if indeed they are represented at 
all”12. Taking part in standardisation meetings held all over the world several times a year 
does not just imply time and money; it also requires expertise to cope with the highly 
technical standardisation committees’ deliberations. While CSOs have unique expertise in 
terms of consumers, workers, or environmental protection, they experience great difficulties 
in turning their general concerns into what Mallard13 describes as the “compulsory figure” of 
the technical language of standard-setting activities. Standardisation organisations have 
acknowledged the difficulties faced by CSOs, without going so far as to recognise an actual 
democratic deficit. In consequence, their response has so far been couched in purely 
procedural terms, with the institutionalisation of consultative committees that rarely take a 
direct part in the development of standards or with no voting right when doing so. The 
importance of socio-technological choices enacted in standards gives CSOs a strong incentive 
to be involved beyond such a consultative role. This brings us back to our research question 
concerning CSOs participation in the making of the authority of international standards . 
Private authority, expertise and participation 
Addressing the relation between the participation of CSOs and the authority of standards 
involves understanding who set such rules, with which knowledge and how to take an active 
part in such processes. Various studies have examined the wide range of institutional designs 
supporting the making of standards, their diffusion and worldwide recognition14. Such a mix 
of public and private design in the world of standards echoes the nébuleuse that Cox refers to 
in discussing official and unofficial networks, with representatives of business, the state and 
                                                                                                                                                   
2005); Benoît Frydman and Arnaud Van Wayenberge, eds., Gouverner par les standards et les 
indicateurs (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2014). 
12 Ulrich Bamberg, “ Le rôle des syndicats allemands dans le processus de normalisation national et 
européen“, Newsletter du BTS, Vol. 24-25 (2004), p. 13. 
13 Alexandre Mallard, “L’écriture des normes“, Réseaux, No. 102 (2000), p. 57. 
14 Kristina Tamm Hallström, Organizing international standardization (Cheltenham: E. Elgar, 2004); 
Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe, The New Global Rulers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); 
Stefan Timmermans and Steven Epstein, “A World of Standards but not a Standard World: Toward a 
Sociology of Standards and Standardization“, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 36 (2010), pp. 69-89; 
Murphy and Yates, op. cit.; Jean-Christophe Graz and Christophe Hauert, “Beyond the Transatlantic 
Divide: the multiple authorities of standards in the global political economy of services“, Business and 
Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2014), pp. 113-50; Ponte, Gibbon and Vestergaard, op. cit.; Jean-Christophe 
Graz and Nafi Niang, eds., Services sans frontières (Paris: Presses de Science Po, 2013); Nils 
Brunsson, Andreas Rasche and David Seidl, “The Dynamics of Standardization: Three Perspectives 
on Standards in Organization Studies“, Organization Studies, Vol. 33, No. 5-6 (2012), pp. 613-632.  
  6 
academia working towards the formulation of a consensual policy for global capitalism15. 
Standards are not only part of the broader organization of the capitalist system16. More 
specifically they belong to the “re-articulation of governance” in which public regulation has 
“retreated in some areas of the economy, at the same time as other forms of governmental and 
inter-governmental regulation are actually being strengthened”17. As Hauert emphasises, “the 
influence of those private arrangements in various institutional environments, their 
relationship with public authorities and the characteristics of actors supporting it remain 
largely ambivalent”18. Such ambivalence is particularly significant with regard to the role of 
expertise and the forms of participation in standards-setting practices.  
Organisational studies have shown that the quality of expertise is instrumental in supporting 
the authority of standards. Organisations eventually conform to so-called voluntary standards 
as they incorporate knowledge “assumed to embody what experts have found to be best”19. 
The scientific and expert knowledge stored in standards provides justification for 
governments and public administration to refer standards into law or, on the contrary, to keep 
the law clear of defining suitable technical means for public purpose – a task left to 
standardisation organisations. In this way, the power of expertise rests on the broader trend 
towards scientisation in world society20. Political scientists emphasise the opposing interests 
shaping expertise, seen as a critical resource used by actors involved in standardisation arenas 
as in many other domains of global governance. As Sending points out, the “question of 
whether and how expert groups may shape policy is therefore subordinate to the question of 
the type and content of knowledge that prevail as authoritative”21. For example, producers 
who need to agree on an international standard for interoperability purpose do not have the 
same interests as consultancy firms whose business model is based on the mere existence of 
certifiable standards, let alone consumer organisations or labour unions likely to use standards 
for health and safety concerns. In technical diplomacy arenas geared towards the economic 
benefits of standardisation, CSOs unmistakably struggle to gain recognition for their own type 
of knowledge. It is usually assumed that they lack sufficient expertise for meaningful 
participation and, therefore, they are confined to consultative mechanisms. Such biased 
understanding of expertise prompts Werle and Iverson to point out that making standards 
authoritative “requires successfully integrating a great plurality of interests and values in the 
standardization process without necessarily requiring the direct participation of the respective 
stakeholders and advocates”22. Choosing between consultation and a more direct participation 
prompts us to discuss the question of inclusiveness in standardisation processes.  
                                                
15 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1987), p. 262; Robert W. Cox, with Michael G. Schechter, The Political Economy of a Plural World 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 33. 
16 Murphy and Yates, op. cit.; Yates and Murphy, op. cit.. 
17 Ponte, Gibbon and Vestergaard, op. cit., p. 7. 
18 La participation des consommateurs à la construction de l’autorité des normes internationales: vers 
une économie politique internationale de la traduction (Lausanne: Université de Lausanne, 2014, 
Doctorat ès Science Politique), p. 2 – our translation. 
19 Nils Brunsson, Bengt Jacobsson and and Associates, A World of Standards (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 45. 
20 Gili S. Drori and John Meyer, “Scientization: Making the World Safe for Organizing“, in Marie-
Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson (eds.), Transnational Governance (Cambirdge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp. 31-52. 
21 Ole Jacob Sending, The Politics of Expertise (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015), p. 8. 
22 Raymund Werle and E.J. Iversen, “Promoting legitimacy in technical standardization“, Science, 
Technology & Innovation Studies, Vol. 2 (2006), p. 33. 
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Studies on voluntary standards (be it technical or on broader sustainability issues) never fail to 
mention the under-representation of consumer associations, trade unions, environmental non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and small and medium enterprises (SME)23. Common 
explanations include the lack of awareness and insufficient temporal, financial and cognitive 
resources24. Most of them draw from various strands of institutionalism. For instance, rational 
institutionalist studies focus on the supply and demand of standards: while the supply of open 
and fair procedures is seen as a prerequisite for participation, the demand-side depends on 
information, expertise, interest and operational capacity – resources seen as generally lacking 
among CSOs25. Other studies examine how the inclusiveness of participation supports a 
formal recognition of global governance mechanisms such as standards26. They perceive 
CSOs as stakeholders whose involvement affects the credibility and legitimacy of 
international standards27.  
Expertise and participation are thus seen both as depending on resources and procedural 
constraints or as embedded in broader structures of power. Institutionalist accounts tend to 
leave expertise in a black box, thus ignoring power relations concerning the production of 
knowledge. Moreover, they take for granted the distinction between lay- and expert –
knowledge. As a result, they fail to question the supposed lack of expertise for a meaningful 
involvement of CSOs. Finally, for those studies that consider participation, the question is 
more about how standardisation institutions include stakeholders than the other way round, 
i.e. how CSOs themselves engage with standardisation. The inclusiveness of standardisation 
processes here remains one-sided.  
Science and technology studies (STS) help us to disentangle the authority of scientific and 
expert knowledge and participatory concerns in socio-technical processes such as 
standardization. A prominent achievement of STS has been to bring science and society, 
material and societal orders closer together. This presumes questioning the distinction 
between lay- and expert-knowledge. The embeddedness of scientific and technological 
choices into social, cultural and political contexts and institutions has prompted Jasanoff to 
                                                
23 See for instance: EIM Business & Policy Research, Access to Standardisation. Study for the 
European Commission, Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General. Final Report (Zoetermeer (NL), 
2009), pp. 98, 81, see also Table 6.20; Mari Morikawa and Jason Morrison, Who develops ISO 
standards? A survey of participation in ISO’s international standards development processes 
(Oakland (CA): Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, 2004); 
Christophe Hauert, “Where Are You ? Consumers' Associations in Standardization, A Case Study on 
Switzerland“, International Journal of IT Standards & Standardization Research, Vol. 8, No. 1 
(2010), pp. 11-27. 
24 Susanne K. Schmidt and Raymund Werle, Coordination Technology (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 
1998), pp. 87-9; Tamm Hallström, op. cit., p. 32; Michelle Egan, “Regulatory strategies, delegation 
and European market integration“, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1998), p. 492. 
25 Mattli and Woods, op. cit.; Mattli and Büthe, op. cit.  
26 Klaus Dingwerth, “Global Democracy and the Democratic Minimum: Why Procedures Alone Are 
Insufficient“, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2014), pp. 1024-1048; 
Klaus Dingwerth and Patrizia Nanz, “Participation“, in Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd and Iain 
Johnstone (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016); Agni Kalfagianni and Philipp Pattberg, The Effectiveness of Transnational Rule-Setting 
Organisations in Global Sustainability Politics: An Analytical Framework (Amsterdam, 2011). 
27 Anne Wilcock and Alejandra Colina, “Consumer representation on consensus standards committees: 
a value-added practice“, International Journal of Services and Standards, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2007), pp. 1–
17; Magnus Böström, “Regulatory Credibility and Authority through Inclusiveness: Standardization 
Organizations in Cases of Eco-Labelling“, Organization, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2006), pp. 345-367; Werle 
and Iversen, op. cit. 
  8 
forge the concept of co-production, according to which “there cannot be a proper history of 
scientific things independent of power and culture”28. It is from this perspective that studies 
reveal the inclusion and exclusion power of the expertise developed by a coherent and multi-
positioned small group of scientists in shaping standards, certification and accreditation in 
crucial public policies, such as food hazards control, agriculture or finance29. 
STS and participation studies shed light on the importance of considering expertise as fully 
heterogeneous, rather than confined in a secluded realm. They highlight the extent to which 
expertise and participation relate to each other and are likely to take various forms in 
international standardisation as in any other socio-technical arenas30. So-called “public 
understanding of science” and “public debate” are the most common forms of participation. 
They reproduce, however, the distinction between lay- and expert-knowledge. They see 
expertise as science applied to decision, its legitimacy confirmed by its autonomy from 
society. In contrast, what Callon and his co-authors call “extended translation” involves both 
experts and laymen in framing and setting the knowledge used for solving socio-technical 
issues ; such practices take place in “hybrid fora”, designed as exploratory spaces open to 
heterogeneous groups, knowledge and experiences31. Here, CSOs and citizens are in a 
position to frame technical issues before imagining potential solutions, rather than providing 
their own knowledge to solve problems defined elsewhere. From this angle, the inclusiveness 
of standardisation processes depends as much on the public engagement with standards as on 
standardisation procedures including the public. However, power relations involved in linking 
lay- and expert-knowledge mostly play out in the context of socio-technical controversies. For 
better or for worse, standards rarely become rabble-rousers. The importance of innovative 
arenas and procedures in hybrid fora is one thing. In the absence of controversies, 
understanding the possibility of filling these fora in the first place is another. Moreover, it 
remains unclear how such fora can match the global reach of the institutional environment of 
standardisation. The extended translation supported by hybrid fora has so far mainly been 
considered at the national level. Finally, understanding the preconditions of the co-production 
of knowledge does not necessarily provide insights into the ability of such knowledge to 
influence the outcome of socio-technical choices not limited to the institutional environment 
of the fora themselves.  
                                                
28 Jasanoff, op. cit., p. 21. 
29 David Demortain, Scientists And The Regulation Of Risk (Cheltenham: E.Elgar, 2011); Busch, 
Standards. Recipes for Reality, op. cit. ; Allison Loconto and Lawrence Busch, “Standards, techno-
economic networks, and playing fields: Performing the global market economy“, Review of 
International Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2010), pp. 507-536; Tony Porter, “Tracing 
Associations in Global Finance“, International Political Sociology, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2013), pp. 334-338. 
30  Sherry R. Arnstein, “Ladder Of Citizen Participation“, Journal of the American Planning 
Association, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1969), pp. 216-224; Massimiano Bucchi and Federico Neresini, “Science 
and public participation“, in Edward J. Hackett, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch and Judy 
Wajcman (eds.), The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 
2008), pp. 449-473; Callon, “Des différentes formes de démocratie technique”, op. cit; Daniel J. 
Fiorino, “Citizen Participation and Environmental Risks: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms“, 
Science, Technology & Human Values, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1990), pp. 226-243; Andrew Stirling, 
“Opening Up or Closing Down? Analysis, Participation and Power in the Social Appraisal of 
Technology“, in Melissa Leach, Ian Scoones and Brian Wynne (eds.), Science and Citizens: 
Globalization and the Challenge of Engagement (London: Zed, 2007), pp. 218–231. 
31 Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, op. cit.  
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Translating technical diplomacy 
Our analytical framework draws on these various contributions, while overcoming some 
controversy- and domestic-dependent understanding of socio-technical co-production. It 
draws upon the sociology of translation32 and supplements the hybrid fora model developed 
by Callon and his co-authors with a distinct focus on how encounter points between lay- and 
expert-knowledge play out in the technical diplomacy of CSOs within standardisation 
processes. Callon and his co-author locate such encounter points at three moments providing 
insights for an in-depth understanding of the co-production of socio-technical knowledge 
embodied in standards33. The first moment is defined as the “transportation of the complex 
world into the laboratory”34. This supposes processes by which the scientists reduce the 
complexity of the big world into the manageable scale of the laboratory in order to conduct 
experiments to reproduce real life conditions. With regard to the world of international 
standards and a meaningful involvement of CSOs, this can be understood as the ability to 
frame the world of standards in a way that would sufficiently raise CSOs’ concerns to make 
them ready to engage with the laboratory of standard-setting practices – in other words to 
become standards-setters themselves. The second is the “research collective at work”35, that is 
the production of knowledge in the microcosm of the laboratory in which discussions take 
place, interpretations vary, and controversies occur on socio-technical issues. Here, the 
knowledge produced depends on who takes part to the research collective. In the microcosm 
of standard-setting practices, this moment sheds light on the potential of a pluralism of 
expertise supported by a direct participation of CSOs in technical diplomacy, rather than its 
confinement to an advisory role. The third is the “transportation of laboratory results into the 
big world”36. This moment describes the ability to transpose results from the research 
collective back to the real world, that is the extent to which such results may be accepted by 
society at large. In the context of the current analysis, this moment corresponds to how CSOs’ 
involvement in standard-setting procedures is likely to have a concrete outcome and thus 
shape the content of international standards.  
The sociology of translation has provided critical accounts of cases of scientific knowledge 
production and the use of expertise in global governance37. It also provides insights to identify 
potential encounter points between CSOs and global rulers at the three moments described 
above. Such encounter points are the framing of problems, the constitution of research 
collectives, and the final transposition between the knowledge produced in the research 
collective and its broader recognition by society. With respect to the world of international 
standards and a meaningful involvement of CSOs, the encounter points lie in a distinct 
institutional environment that combine problem framing and CSOs’ involvement, requires a 
wide range of different types of knowledge in the constitution of research collectives, and 
                                                
32 Akrich, Callon and Latour, op. cit.  
33 Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, op. cit., pp. 75-104. 
34 Ibid., p. 78. 
35 Ibid., p. 79. 
36 Ibid., p. 98. 
37 Tobias Berger and Alejandro Esguerra, eds., World politics in translation (London: Routledge, 
2018); Andrew Barry, “The Translation Zone: Between Actor-Network Theory and International 
Relations“, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2013), pp. 413-429; 
Jacqueline Best and William Walters, “Translating the Sociology of Translation“, International 
Political Sociology, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2013), pp. 345-349; Vaughan Higgins, “Re-figuring the problem of 
farmer agency in agri-food studies: A translation approach“, Agriculture and Human Values, Vol. 23, 
No. 1 (2006), pp. 51-62; Diana Stuart, “Science, Standards, and Power: New food Safety Governance 
in California“, Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2010), pp. 111-140. 
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expects at least some outcome in the final transposition, i.e. the substance of the international 
standard under negotiation. In other words, in technical diplomacy, encounter points to be 
reckoned with include the mobilisation of CSO’s, a pluralisation of knowledge, and influence 
on the content of international standards. This prompts us to elaborate further on CSOs’ 
participation in the distinct moments of such extended translation. We will discuss the issue 
of involving CSOs in standardisation processes, the ensuing production of knowledge and the 
influence that they may eventually have on the content of international standards under 
negotiation. 
First, the enlistment of CSOs towards technical diplomacy supposes establishing a 
relationship between their issue area, their strategic objectives and underpinning principles on 
the one hand, and the production of technical specifications at the international level on the 
other. Enrolling CSOs in international standardisation requires a minimum of awareness and 
affinity with their own projects. The increasing political significance of standards presumes 
making it a privileged tool for CSOs’ action. Yet the intricate institutional characteristics of 
standard-setting bodies challenge their ability to make it part of their repertoire of actions. 
Above all, given CSOs’ limited resources, they may rightly question the value of participating 
in deliberations whose results remain unclear in view of the voluntary dimension of 
international standardisation. Moreover, most associations conceive their action on a local or 
national scale, while international standards are per se intended for a global reach. The work 
of technical committees is supposed to be based on the state of the art of scientific and 
technical knowledge; this in itself makes technical language a “compulsory figure” of 
standard-setting processes at the expense of many CSOs’ enrolment38. Yet, officially, 
standardisation procedures are fully open to any actor deemed fit to participate to committees 
established by national standardisation bodies. How may CSOs successfully seize this 
opportunity despite these difficulties? In contrast to conventional views on the lack of 
resources as the main barrier to CSOs’ participation, allocation of resources remains a matter 
of strategic decisions; almost all organisations contend with limited resources. Moreover, a 
CSO may be encouraged to participate when the scope of an international standard under 
negotiation has a close relationship with its core principles and priority objectives, and 
moreover involves a timeline likely to match projects undertaken in this regard. Under such 
circumstances, CSOs realise that standards may have more power than their supposedly 
strictly voluntary dimension and that it may be worthwhile taking part in their definition.  
The second encounter point shaping CSOs involvement in standardisation is the combination 
of knowledge required to translate the general concerns of CSOs into technical specifications 
and, in turn, to convert technical specifications into societal issues. In addition to CSOs’ 
experience in their own field of practices, a wide range of knowledge is required to engage 
and contribute to standard development processes. This not only includes scientific and 
technical expertise in relation to the topic drafted as international standard, but also the 
complex procedural rules used in standardisation arenas, as well as those applied in wider 
state and inter-governmental regulatory environments. Thus, the pooling of knowledge which 
includes specialized and ad-hoc analytical and procedural skills can support CSOs’ socio-
technical contribution to the world of standardisation. The fact remains, however, that 
business interests often trump scientific rationality in standard-setting processes39. Power 
relations, economic considerations and liability issues may therefore arise and easily outplay 
such pooling of knowledge.  
                                                
38 Mallard, op. cit. 
39 Stuart, op. cit. 
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The third encounter point of CSOs’ engagement with international standardisation entails 
their influence on the content of international standards under negotiations. This supposes 
understanding how the distinct institutional environment of international standardisation is 
likely to shape such influence. In contrast to hybrid fora devised to set innovative procedures 
and decision-making processes, standardisation arenas operate according to well-established 
rules of procedures that predetermine the potential influence of participation. Technical 
diplomacy in this sense echoes the complex and politicized environment that Barry describes 
as a translation zone “marked by enduring blockages and intransigent obstacles”40. For 
instance, to elicit compliance with voluntary standards, the standardisation process is 
frequently geared towards the definition of the lowest common denominator, and thus likely 
to bar too stringent claims from CSOs. In contrast, despite the frequent over-representation of 
corporations, consultancy firms and business associations, the voluntary dimension of 
standards-setting activities can provide unexpected leverage to those present and willing to 
contribute, including CSOs. In the rare cases where usually overrepresented actors are less 
involved, it can contribute to designing more demanding standards in domains such as safer 
workplaces, healthier products or environmental protection.  
To sum up, our analytical framework details three encounter points in technical diplomacy 
likely to shape CSOs participation in standard-setting bodies and, more broadly, provide ways 
of coping with the democratic deficit of arenas of transnational private governance such as the 
ISO. The first encounter point relates to the involvement of CSOs and the difficult exercise of 
translating the complex world of standardisation and distinct issues raised by standards under 
development into CSOs strategic objectives. The second aims at pooling lay- and expert-
knowledge into a proper mix of diverse cognitive skills. The third considers the transposition 
of CSOs involvement in standard-setting processes back into the content of standards used to 
shape markets and society. In other words, it provides the reality check of their influence on 
the outcome of the drafting process of standards. This leads us to discuss CSOs’ participation 
in technical diplomacy as translation processes that converge on the three encounter points of 
CSOs involvement, knowledge pluralisation, and drafting outcome. It is against this 
background that we now turn to the analysis of the engagement of CSOs with standard-setting 
processes.  
 
INTERNORM calling: being involved or not? 
The world of international standards is challenging for CSOs involvement. At first sight, the 
sheer number and wide range of international standards under development, their highly 
specific nature, their global reach make hardly any sense in relation to CSOs’ own priorities, 
strategic objectives and geographical scope of action. While a greater awareness of the 
regulatory power of international standards is a prerequisite for a meaningful involvement of 
CSOs, uncertainties regarding the effective impact of so-called voluntary standards on 
business practices as well as the potential instrumentalisation of their participation by 
standard-setting organisations question the relevance for CSOs to become standard-setters 
themselves.  
Before the launch of the INTERNORM project, only one associative partner had prior 
experience in standardisation activities. Thus, one of the first tasks of the research team was 
to invite CSOs active at national and international level to join the project. The 
correspondence engaged with CSOs showed that the lack of awareness on the socio-political 
                                                
40 Barry, op. cit., p. 249. 
  12 
salience of international standards was the first barrier to a meaningful participation. We 
needed to provide specific examples of on-going standardisation activities with more direct 
bearing on CSOs’ concerns. This observation is far from trivial; it implied identifying 
precisely the standards being developed among the thousands of ISO committees and working 
groups likely to reflect CSOs priorities and thus providing a potential avenue for action. In 
2010, no less than 214 technical committees (TC) were active at the ISO, discussing more 
than 3’880 standardisation projects. Thus, the research team carefully screened 
standardisation areas and technical committees of potential interest for associative partners 
and identified several themes relevant to civil society, mainly based on the transversality of 
the issue at stake and the development stage of the draft standard(s). As seen above, a 
deliberative meeting with CSOs led to the choice of the distinct topics of nanotechnology 
(ISO TC 229) and tourism services (ISO TC 228). 
For a meaningful involvement in the world of international standards, CSOs’ scope of action, 
priorities and strategic objectives matter; they provide the lens through which the relevance of 
specific standardisation activities is assessed. As noted above, CSOs often face difficulty in 
linking their activities, principally conducted at the local or national level, with international 
negotiations. Reconciling the international scope of standards devised within the ISO with 
strategies geared to national or regional projects and regulations is a challenge. It is therefore 
not surprising that some of the CSOs we contacted declined our invitation pleading their 
strictly local or regional scope of action. While establishing links between an international 
arena and the local or regional level could be an important obstacle to some CSOs’ 
involvement, it can also, in other cases, provide an incentive to participate. For instance, the 
involvement in tourism standards resulted from the convergence between national and 
international issues, such as sustainable tourism, the promotion of the Swiss know-how in 
tourism, and the protection of consumers travelling abroad. In this perspective, 
standardisation topics with strong echo in the national debate will encourage the involvement 
of CSOs. Interest of trade unions or consumers' associations interests' in nanotechnology 
standards was boosted by their own priorities and projects, such as ensuring workplace safety 
in the chemical industry or transparency of information and freedom of choice for consumers. 
Thus, the relevance of specific standardisation topics to their agenda, priorities and scope of 
action clearly influences CSOs’ decision to themselves become standard-setters. Inevitably, 
any such decision impacts upon the specific institutional environment in which standard-
setting activities take place. 
Even as CSOs recognized the regulatory power of standards beyond their supposedly strictly 
voluntary dimension, they still questioned the relevance and value of their involvement in the 
technical diplomacy of international standardisation. Organisations like ISO never fail to 
stress the voluntary nature of the adoption standards, thus contrasting with CSOs actions 
favouring legislation and binding regulations over voluntary arrangements. Yet, although 
some international standards do acquire a quasi-legal status when referenced into legislation 
or might become de facto market access requirements, uncertainties remain regarding the 
extent to which a distinct international standard will shape business practices or be used in 
support of legislation. In other words, the uncertain impact of international standards question 
the relevance of CSOs’ involvement. Standardisation arenas are not easily perceived as a 
privileged target for CSOs, This is all the more the case when CSOs view their mere 
participation as a risk of legitimizing the regulatory power of international standards. 
CSOs involved in the project frequently asked what do CSOs stand to gain from their 
participation in the world of international standards. CSOs are concerned by the risk of 
instrumentalisation of their participation while the payoff for their resource-intensive 
participation is far from certain. Whatever their effective influence on the content of the 
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published standard, like any other participants, they are part of the perceived consensus 
establishing the standard. In this process, CSOs’ involvement in the standard-setting process 
can be used to legitimize the resulting standard and more generally the trend towards the 
devolution of state power to European and international standardisation arenas. Moreover, the 
fact that standards resulting form voluntary participation are subsequently sold and constitute 
the stock-in-trade of the flourishing market of certification businesses exacerbates the issue of 
instrumentalisation. This contrasts with the difficulty for CSOs to value their involvement in 
standard-setting activities towards their membership. The uncertain impact of standards and 
the consensus-based development makes it impossible for CSOs to enjoy the full glory even if 
their participation brought about a distinct improvement. 
By exploring the extent to which CSOs seize the formal possibility for participation in 
standard-setting bodies, the INTERNORM project has shed light on the wide range of 
elements shaping CSOs’ decision to become standard-setters themselves. Wider 
considerations include in particular the alignment between distinct standardisation work 
programs and CSOs’ own priorities and scope of action, as well as concerns about their 
potential influence and the suitability of standardisation as a regulatory tool. The ambivalence 
of the technical diplomacy of international standards, in its relationships with state regulatory 
power or in its ability to provide de facto market access conditions, affects CSOs’ approaches 
to their involvement in the arenas of standardisation. On the one hand, the risk that their 
participation could be usurped for political ends may have demobilising effects; on the other, 
they may consider that participating in the definition of international standards gives them 
more influence than their supposedly strictly voluntary dimension. To sum up, CSOs’ 
decision to be involved in standard-setting activities is closely linked to the broader 
institutional framework in which their participation takes place and to the opportunities 
provided by the agenda of standard-setting organisations for CSOs’ own priorities. And it is 
precisely here that the INTERNORM project, by lowering otherwise prohibitive entry costs, 
introduced CSOs to the world of international standards and facilitated the identification of 
on-going relevant standard-setting activities.  
INTERNORM sapiens: the pluralisation of standards knowledge  
The second encounter point shaping CSOs’ involvement in standardisation relates to the 
production of knowledge within the microcosm of standard-setting practices and the extent to 
which a plurality of knowledge supports CSOs contribution to the world of standardisation. 
The INTERNORM project confirmed that technical expertise is a crucial requirement for any 
meaningful participation in standard-setting processes. Yet the multi-faceted nature of the 
knowledge likely to support CSOs’ participation involved more than looking for technical 
expertise. Whether it be to frame international standardisation in a way that raises CSOs’ 
concerns or to support their contribution to the content of standards under negotiation, the 
project required distinct forms of knowledge: procedural knowledge of standardisation arenas, 
specialized knowledge of the issue at stake; in-depth understanding of political and legal 
context, as well as an organizational acquaintance with each partner CSO. Certainly, the 
knowledge developed under the aegis of the microcosm of the INTERNORM project was not 
limited to a simple exchange between academics of the steering committee and 
representatives of a given partner CSO. We rapidly realized that it was necessary to reach out 
to a broader pool on an ad-hoc basis – what we call here a pluralisation of knowledge. In the 
discussion that follows, we examine in more detail the procedural and the ad-hoc aspects of 
this second encounter point between lay- and expert knowledge in standard-setting practices. 
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At the beginning of the INTERNORM project, the academic steering committee and its CSO 
partners had hardly any knowledge regarding the content of the standards under negotiation. 
Our first task was to learn how standardisation arenas really work. In other words, the 
procedural knowledge required to cope with standardisation arenas appeared an important 
entry cost for all. We needed to find our way trough the maze of procedural rules governing 
standard-setting processes and information shared on working platforms. This was a 
prerequisite for the huge amount of work required to identify the issues at stake in the 
development of draft international standards under negotiation. As is often the case, the real 
issues were hidden in complex and voluminous documentation. Standardisation committees 
produce a mountain of documents (proposals for new standards, written comments from 
experts, minutes of meetings and resolutions, opinions from external actors, etc.). As for the 
technical committees in which INTERNORM took part, several hundreds of working papers 
had been produced on tourism services, and more than a thousand circulated in the field of 
nanotechnology. To pare such entry costs, the role of the INTERNORM research team was 
crucial. The team summarized a massive amount of information in easily accessible 1-page 
factsheets describing the work under way in a pre-selection of ISO technical committees and 
its relevance for CSO partners. The team also drafted documentation to explain 
standardisation procedures in simple terms, as well as modes and channels of intervention 
according to successive development stages. This procedural expertise was a condition sine 
qua non for any meaningful involvement of CSOs in international standardisation. 
While the procedural knowledge provided by the research team is one part of the pluralisation 
of knowledge supporting CSOs involvement, the highly specialized nature of standard-setting 
debates within drafting committees meant that the project could not only rely on the 
knowledge of academic partners who agreed to be associated with the project when it was 
launched. The research team had to look for cognitive resources on a much more 
heterogeneous basis; it would not be enough just to invite any researcher on the topic. We had 
to identify a type of expertise specifically geared toward helping CSOs understand issues 
related to their own concerns in standards under negotiation. In order to fully recognize the 
significance of a drafting proposal, this included awareness of the wider regulatory 
environment, potential relations with public policy, and implications for production practices. 
In the case of nanotechnologies, for instance, this knowledge ranged from the potential 
legislative impact of standards in the regulatory environment to the toxicology of 
nanomaterials production processes. The INTERNORM research team invited experts from 
various backgrounds to working meetings with CSOs, including a toxicologist of occupational 
health and safety specialised in nanotechnology. In the field of tourism, a public official and 
the chief officer of a Swiss label for sustainable tourism provided insights on the significance 
of international tourism standards in the Swiss legislative environment and on local practices 
and solutions. In each case, the required expert invited on an ad-hoc basis stimulated CSOs’ 
deliberations and led to written comments and proposals subsequently submitted to the 
standardisation committee.  
With this experience, the transfer between the involvement of CSOs in world standardisation 
and actual standard-setting processes rests on what we have here described as a pluralisation 
of knowledge. The INTERNORM project does not just confirm that expertise and 
participation go hand in hand. It also shows that making sense of participation in standard-
setting practices requires an encounter point between lay- and expert-knowledge, both on-
going and ad-hoc. This included CSOs’ queries and insights from the everyday life 
experiences of their members, the procedural knowledge of the INTERNORM research team 
turning such insights into written standardisation proposals, as well as academic and field 
specialists providing expertise for instance on the wider regulatory environment of standards 
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under negotiation. Thus the pooling of knowledge proposed by the INTERNORM project not 
only supported the effective participation of CSOs. It also helped raise new issues and draw 
progressive answers, such as the recognition of uncertainty in conformity with the 
precautionary principle in the field of nanotechnologies. Ultimately, do such progressive 
answers stand any chance of being transposed into international standards? This is the reality 
check discussed in the following section. 
INTERNORM transposed: the reality check 
The INTERNORM project offers insights on the third encounter point affecting the 
participation of CSOs in standardisation arenas. The ability of CSOs to translate their 
involvement in standard setting processes supported by a pluralisation of knowledge back into 
the big world of international standards as used to shape market and society eventually boils 
down to drafting outcomes. This section presents findings on the influence of CSOs 
associated with the INTERNORM project over formal ISO decision-making in the technical 
diplomacy of international standardisation. We first discuss institutional constraints and 
opportunities for CSOs involvement in standard-setting processes; we then examine some 
aspects of actor-driven power relationships encountered throughout the experience of the 
INTERNORM project and shaping CSOs potential influence on the content of standards 
under negotiation. 
Despite high entry costs and the “pay to play” principle governing most standard-setting 
activities, the Swiss standardisation body channelling participation at ISO level supported the 
project by reducing the INTERNORM membership fees. We also had no problem of access to 
expert groups in charge of drafting international standards at the national and international 
level. Moreover, our own comments and drafting recommendations have always been 
accepted by the Swiss mirror committee for transmission to the international level without 
change. Such formal accessibility to deliberative practices remains, however, embedded in a 
constraining institutional environment 
Standardisation bodies view the adoption of international standards by market actors as the 
cornerstone of their work, which inevitably hampers the potential influence of CSOs’ 
participation. Indeed, in order to foster the voluntary adoption and effective use of standards, 
the drafting process is characterized by an effort to find the least constraining consensus. This 
prompts many participants to turn down demands from civil society viewed as posing too 
great a risk of market rejection if included in the content of the published standard. Despite 
the supposedly voluntary character of standards, this has broader implications regarding the 
regulation of markets, for standards are often taken up as a reference in public regulation and 
procurements.  
The INTERNORM project also highlighted the extent to which CSOs’ influence depends on 
wider power relationships. In the tourism sector, for example, industry associations’ 
classification schemes and labels already exist, and as such, the ISO appears as a new 
competitor for professional associations or consortia in charge of those schemes and labels. 
The opposition strategy of the largest players of the hospitality industry with regard to 
international standardisation activities was aimed at preventing any move likely to go down 
this route (for example towards environmental good practices). The involvement of CSOs 
provided an entry point to counter-balance the hospitality industry in standardisation 
activities; the Swiss standardisation body even approached INTERNORM to act as convenor 
of the Swiss mirror committee on tourism services left idle as a result of a deliberate strategy 
of the hospitality industry to coordinate at the European level. After consultation with CSOs 
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taking part to the INTERNORM project, the proposal was turned down. It raised concerns of 
too big an instrumentalisation of CSOs participation.  
In the world of standards, as anywhere else, power relationships are frequently played out in 
procedure and its use to impose hierarchies between issues under negotiation. For instance, in 
the field of nanotechnologies, European and Swiss Consumers’ associations expressed their 
opposition to the notion of intentionality in the definition of nanomaterials. Their view was 
that what matters is the presence or absence of nano-objects in a product, not the intention of 
the producer. However, since the notion of intentionality was present in all previously 
negotiated ISO documents, CSOs’ demands were met with an outright refusal in the name of 
conformity to the internal consistency of standards.	 In the case of the safety of adventure 
tourism, the development of three distinct standards dealing respectively with security 
management, leader competence, and client information (and their potential separate 
adoption) was considered as nonsense for most consumers’ associations, who saw the three 
topics closely related in order to ensure consumers’ safety. But an authoritative body of the 
ISO (the Technical Management Board) turned down demands to merge all three topics, 
arguing that this would not conform to the initial mandate of the working groups and to 
internal rules of ISO regarding the distinctiveness of management system standards. 
Moreover, the working group in charge of drafting requirements for environmentally friendly 
accommodation establishments eventually scaled down its ambition in face of the industry’s 
obstruction. The successful “damage limitation strategy” of the hospitality industry – as one 
of its representative described it – led to establishing mere guidelines rather than a proper 
international standard with substantial requirements.  
These findings suggest that CSOs’ influence depends on the existence of open and fair 
procedures as much as on power relations within standardisation committees. This shows the 
limited influence of CSOs over the content of standards. However, the voluntary basis of 
participation in standardisation processes can also provide unexpected avenues to influence 
the content of standards. In the cases discussed here, this even led to several circumstances in 
which a single actor (INTERNORM) defined per se the so-called national position. For 
instance, during a vote on a draft standard, INTERNORM was the only voting member of the 
Swiss mirror committee. In accordance with the existing procedures, the Swiss vote at the 
ISO was based on this single vote, thus emphasising the extent to which the content of a 
standard can depend upon the participation of one single actor. While this example underlines 
the influence that CSOs may gain on the sole basis of their participation, it further confirms 
that the potential influence of CSOs participation is closely related to the configuration of 
actors taking part (or not) to specific standard-setting activities.  
In brief, it comes as no surprise that only mixed results could derive from the encounter point 
in which CSOs involved in the INTERNORM project aimed at influencing the drafting 
outcomes of international standards. Institutional constraints, procedural tactics and a genuine 
power hierarchy clearly bound the potential influence of CSOs. And CSOs will only take part 
in standardisation, if they find there a balance between their strategic objectives (e.g. 
transparency of nano-products throughout the whole production	chain), some expectation of 
the possibility to influence the content of standards and an assumption that the standard under 
negotiations will eventually be widely used on the market. Yet the uncertainty resulting from 
the principle of voluntary participation can provide unexpected – though limited – leverage 
for enlisted CSOs. The simple fact of participating grants influence. 
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Conclusions  
The argument made in this article is that CSOs’ participation in arenas of technical diplomacy 
such as committees in charge of drafting ISO international standards depends on multiple 
translation practices that unfold in three distinct encounter points between lay- and expert-
knowledge. Regarding the first sequence, our findings has shown that a great deal of CSOs’ 
involvement in socio-technical processes depends on how particular standards under 
development in the ISO echo their agenda, priorities and scope of action. As for the second, 
our analysis has emphasized the co-production of expert- and lay-knowledge likely to support 
an effective participation of CSOs in standard-setting processes rests on a wider range of ad-
hoc and diverse skills than just pooling academic expertise with associations’ own experience. 
Finally, results regarding the third encounter point suggest that outcomes resulting from such 
CSOs’ involvement and pluralisation of knowledge reflect powerful asymmetries and 
procedural constraints, with however a few unexpected opportunities to shape the content of 
international standards officially published by the ISO. Far from the shallow inclusiveness 
discussed by most scholarship on new forms of regulation and global governance or the 
controversy-dependent and local or national confinement of hybrid fora of STS scholars, the 
INTERNORM project described in this article thus shows a comprehensive knowledge co-
production process and its quite specific requirements for addressing the democratic deficit 
that international standardisation processes face, like many other socio-technical processes.  
A first implication of such findings is to emphasize the extent to which all three encounter 
points may depend on mere chance. Important limits to our analysis include the fact that the 
topics in which CSOs experienced their own standard-setting practices are of varying 
importance and differ in their potential to generate socio-technical controversies. It thus may 
not make much sense to compare CSOs’ concerns in nanotechnologies and in tourism and 
related services. The case studied here may also suffer from idiosyncrasy. The academic 
identity of the INTERNORM project and its location in Switzerland – a country renowned for 
its participatory democracy – surely helped the recognition within international 
standardisation arenas of CSOs interests conveyed by the platform. Despite the organized and 
externally funded platform set for the INTERNORM project, serendipity also characterised 
the ability of both the research team and CSOs with whom it made contact to exploit windows 
of opportunity, including personal relationships. For instance, the participation of a trade 
union representative undoubtedly responded to priorities and workplace experience of his 
umbrella association, but the fact that he was a fellow graduate in political science surely also 
helped! This suggests that it might be more difficult to transform into hybrid fora existing 
arenas of negotiations such as technical committees of standard-setting bodies than, quite the 
reverse, to create hybrid fora from scratch when public disputes arise on socio-technical 
controversies. On a more general basis, this mitigates the sometimes over-optimistic 
assumptions on participatory dynamics in social movements and models of deliberative 
democracy41.  
Finally, our findings resonate with recent scholarship on the practice turn in the field of 
international relations and what Best and Walters call the “materiality of knowledge”42. This 
supposes following translation trails, be it the co-production of knowledge leading to drafting 
                                                
41 Laura Seguin, “Entre conflit et participation : double apprentissage dans un mini-public et un 
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pp. 3-22. 
42 Best and Walters, op. cit., p. 347. 
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ISO international standards or any other translation practices such as counter-piracy best 
management practices recently developed by states and the maritime industry43. As Berger 
and Esguera point out, translation practices that move objects in world politics not only 
require power, but also forge new relations and open space for differences44. The multiple 
translation practices experienced by the INTERNORM project have shown that a modest 
platform to reinforce the participation of local CSOs in remote arenas of technical diplomacy 
can forge new relations and open new space for differences in ISO standard-setting 
committees in spite of strong power asymmetries. In a sense, it echoes the “collaborative 
encounters” experienced in critical international political economy methodologies likely to 
engage “with aspects of social life that remain unseen, unheard, uncounted or 
unacknowledged within prevailing understandings of capitalism”45. However, as far as 
INTERNORM is concerned, the mechanisms designed to support CSO’s involvement and to 
pool an ad-hoc and on-going knowledge have only led to limited outcomes.  
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